

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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P R 221910Z OCT 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2844

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0422

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 22, 1975.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 22, 1975

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE
INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE CONTENT OF THE DEFINI-
TIONS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED UNDER
THE NEW AGREEMENT (ARTICLE II OF THE JOINT DRAFT). WE
INTEND TO EXPRESS SOME CONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE
U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 8, 1975 AND THE NEW
WORDING IT TABLED FOR ARTICLE II.

ON THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS. A
COMPARISON OF THE FORMULATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR
ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, SHOWS THAT THERE ARE COINCIDING OR CLOSE
ELEMENTS IN THE DEFINITIONS PROPOSED BY THE SIDES FOR
LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 8, 1975

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STILL RETAINS SOME ELEMENTS WHICH CANNOT BE CONSIDERED

JUSTIFIED.

AS YOU KNOW, ACCORDING TO THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, ARTICLE I OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT--CONCERNING THE OBLIGATION NOT TO START CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL FIXED LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS-- IS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THIS WAS INCORPORATED IN ARTICLE IV, PAR. 1, OF THE DRAFT BEING PREPARED.

IT IS NATURAL, TOO, THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST ALSO RETAIN THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, ADOPTED BY THE SIDES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE AID-MEMOIRE DIRECTLY SPECIFICS THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL INCLUDE THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972.

THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, ARE CONSTRUCTED IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING. THEY ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE U.S. SIDE'S DESIRE TO INDICATE A SPECIFIC RANGE IN KILOMETERS.

IT FOLLOWS WITH ABSOLUTE CLARITY FROM THE AIDE-MEMOIRE AND FROM THE ESSENCE OF THE MATTER ITSELF AS WELL, THAT LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ARE ONE OF THE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EQUAL OVERALL LEVEL TO BE ESTABLISHED (2,400). THE SIDES CLEARLY UNDERSTAND PRECISELY WHICH SYSTEMS THIS APPLIES TO, AND VERIFICATION OF THE LIMITATION ON LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS IS FAULTLESSLY CARRIED OUT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AS THE EXPERIENCE OF IMPLEMENTING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ALSO DEMONSTRATES.

NONETHELESS, IT IS PROPOSED THAT A CONCEPT OF SOME SORT OF "ANY DEVICES" WHICH "CAN BE USED" FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE ALSO BE INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION, THE CONTENT OF WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY SORT OF MISUNDERSTANDING ON EITHER SIDE.

THIS GIVES RISE TO PERPLEXITY.

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IT IS TOTALLY UNCLEAR PRECISELY WHAT "ANY DEVICES" THE U.S. SIDE HAS IN MIND AND WHAT IS MEANT BY "CAN BE USED."

WE ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, IN THE FORM PROPOSED OCTOBER 8, 1975, WOULD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ARBITRARY INTERPRETATION OF THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE QUESTION WHICH ARE AT THE

VERY HEART OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT--THE EQUAL
MAXIMUM LEVELS OF 2,400, TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS WOULD CLEARLY NOT BE IN ACCORD WITH
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE OVERALL CEILINGS TO BE ESTABLISHED, IT IS
PRECISELY LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS WHICH SHOULD BE COUNTED,
AND NOT THOSE THINGS THAT ARE NOT SUCH LAUNCHERS. TO INCLUDE
"ANY DEVICES," REFERRED TO IN THE U.S. FORMULATION, AMONG THE
SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED WOULD TRANSFORM THE SUBJECT OF THE
LIMITATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED INTO AN UNDECIPHERABLE PHRASE.

DURING THE PERIOD SINCE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
NOTHING HAS HAPPENED WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CHANGING THE
CURRENT DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS. THE
DEFINITION ADOPTED HAS PROVED ITS VIABILITY; IT ADEQUATELY
REFLECTS THE STATE OF AFFAIRS WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT
AS WELL. ITS RETENTION IN THE TEXT OF ARTICLE II WOULD BE
FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CONTENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES, RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, AND
WOULD BE IN LINE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIA-
TIONS TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END
OF 1985.

ON THE DEFINITION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS. WE NOTE THE
CONSIDERATION EXPRESSED IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT
AT THE OCTOBER 8, 1975 MEETING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SIDES
ARE AGREED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS DEFINITION. THIS CONCLU-
SION SUGGESTS ITSELF UPON COMPARISON OF THE FORMULATIONS
TABLED FOR ARTICLE II, PARA. 2.

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2845
INFO AMEMASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0422

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 STIPULATES THAT, ALONG WITH CERTAIN OTHER STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, SLBM LAUNCHERS ARE AMONG THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN EQUAL AGGREGATE MAXIMUM LEVEL OF 2,400.

THIS ACCORD IS BASED ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING BY THE SIDES OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN SLBM LAUNCHER AND WHICH OF THESE ARE TO BE COUNTED WITHIN THE AFOREMENTIONED AGGREGATE LEVEL. THIS UNDERSTANDING IS EMBODIED IN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS IN THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES, WHICH ACCOMPANIED THAT AGREEMENT OR WERE ADOPTED LATER IN AMPLIFICATION OF THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS.

THE DEFINITION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS, CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET WORDING OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE. IT WAS PREPARED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO, THE PROTOCOL OF JULY 24, 1972, AS WELL AS THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES OF JULY 3, 1974.

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THE VERSION OF THE DEFINITION SUBMITTED OCTOBER 8, 1975 ALSO REFERS TO SLBM LAUNCHERS. BUT IT ALSO CONTAINS ANOTHER ELEMENT--A NEW CONCEPT OF "ANY DEVICE" ON SUBMARINES "WHICH CAN BE USED" FOR LAUNCHING A BALLISTIC MISSILE.

THIS RAISES QUESTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH ARISE ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSAL TO ADD TO THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, AS DISCUSSED ABOVE. THE FORMULATION OF OCTOBER 8, 1975 INJECTS AN ELEMENT OF VAGUENESS AND MYSTERY INTO THE SLBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION, WHICH BY THE VERY ESSENCE OF ITS ROLE IN THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT MUST BE PRECISE AND DEFINITE. THE NEBULOUS NATURE OF SUCH A FORMULATION LEADS TO BLURRING THE CONTOURS OF THE SUBJECT OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED, AND IN ESSENCE DEPRIVES THE DEFINITION BEING WORKED OUT OF ITS DEFINITIVE CHARACTER.

WHAT SPECIFICALLY IS MEANT IN THIS CASE BY "ANY DEVICE"? PERHAPS, IN ADDITION TO THE SIDES' EXISTING SLBM LAUNCHERS,

AS PRESENTLY UNDERSTOOD AND VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, SOME OTHER DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES FROM SUBMARINES ARE POSSIBLY ENVISAGED? THUS FAR ONE CAN ONLY ENGAGE IN CONJECTURES ABOUT THIS DUE TO THE INDISTINCT NATURE OF THE WORDING OF THE PROPOSED DEFINITION. ONE THING IS QUITE INDISPUTABLE--THIS SORT OF FORMULATION FOR DEFINING SLBM LAUNCHERS, WHICH DISTORTS THE MEANING OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS JUSTIFIED OR AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE NECESSARY PRECISION OF THE OBLIGATION TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SIDES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

IN THIS CONNECTION, ONE MORE THING. THE OCTOBER 8, 1975 VERSION PROPOSES THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, BE DEFINED SEPARATELY FOR THE U.S. AND SEPARATELY FOR THE USSR. SUCH A DIFFERENTIATION IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE. THE WORDING PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE DOES NOT CONTAIN SUCH DISTINCTION--IT HAS A SINGLE DEFINITION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS, FOR THE SOVIET AS WELL AS THE U.S. SIDE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET DEFINITION, BEING MORE COMPACT AND COMPREHENSIVE, AT THE SAME TIME FULLY COVERS THE CONTENT OF THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, IN ITS U.S. VERSION,

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AND THIS PRESENTS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SLBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION.

ON THE DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS. HERE, TOO, THERE ARE COINCIDING OF CLOSE ELEMENTS.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE SIDES AGREE THAT THE 2,400 AGGREGATE LEVEL MUST INCLUDE NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT, FOR THE U.S., B-52 AND B-1; FOR THE USSR, TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV.

THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ARE ALSO SUBSTANTIALLY CLOSE ON HOW TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING CORRESPONDING NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED AMONG THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE FORMULATION PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, "WITH CHARACTERISTICS SIMILAR OR SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED NUCLEAR DELIVERY HEAVY BOMBERS," WHICH CONCERNS NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS BEING ESTABLISHED, ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE ESSENCE OF THE MATTER, AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CONTENT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. AND CONVERSELY, TO INTRODUCE INTO THE DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS THE CONCEPT OF "CAPABILITIES COMPARABLE TO THOSE" WOULD LEAD

TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ARBITRARY INTERPRETATIONS WHEN RESOLVING
THE QUESTION OF WHICH NEW AIRCRAFT BEING ORE TO BE DEVELOPED
WOULD BE SUBJECT TO INCLUSION AMONG THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2846

INFO AMEMASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0422

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

AS FOR THE AIRCRAFT THE U.S. SIDE CALLS BACKFIRE, I
WOULD AGAIN LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING ON THIS MATTER. THE
AIRCRAFT CALLED BACKFIRE IN THE U.S. ARE MEDIUM BOMBERS. THE
QUESTION RAISED BY THE U.S. SIDE OF INCLUDING THEM AMONG
HEAVY BOMBERS IS CONTRIVED AND ONLY COMPLICATES THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS. REFERENCE TO CERTAIN CLEARLY SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS
OF THE CAPABILITIES ATTRIBUTED TO THIS AIRCRAFT, IS UNFOUNDED.
THE THESIS OF IN-AIR REFUELING ALSO DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY
GROUNDS TO INCLUDE THIS AIRCRAFT AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS. AS
YOU KNOW, WITH IN-AIR REFUELING EVEN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
CAN CARRY OUT INTERCONTINENTAL FLIGHTS. WELL THEN, SHOULD
THEY, TOO, BE CLASSIFIED AS HEAVY BOMBERS? CONTRIVED, TOO,
ARE THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED CONCERNING
SOME SORT OF HYPOTHETICAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS AIR-
CRAFT COULD SUPPOSEDLY USE THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES
FOR LANDING.

UNSOUND ALSO ARE THE ATTEMPTS TO CLASSIFY THIS MEDIUM
BOMBER AS A HEAVY BOMBER ON THE BASIS THAT MODERN TECHNOLOGY
WAS USED FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT. IS IS NATURAL THAT ALL NEW
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AIRCRAFT--LIGHT, MEDIUM OR HEAVY--ARE DEVELOPED ON THE BASIS
OF NEW TECHNOLOGY. BUT THIS CAN IN NO WAY SERVE AS A REASON
FOR INCLUDING AIRCRAFT OF ONE TYPE AMONG AIRCRAFT OF ANOTHER
TYPE.

ALSO INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE AGREEMENT
BEING WORKED OUT IS THE PROPOSED FORMULATION CONCERNING
"TYPES OF AIRCRAFT HOWEVER CONFIGURED."

IT CLEARLY FOLLOWS FROM THE CONTENT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE
THAT UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT LIMITATIONS ARE TO APPLY TO
"HEAVY BOMBERS IF THE LATTER ARE EQUIPPED WITH BOMBS OR
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE NOT EXCEEDING 600 KILO-
METERS," I.E. PRECISELY TO NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES.
ACCORDING TO THE LOGIC OF THE FORMULATION PROPOSED OCTOBER 8,
1975 WITH RESPECT TO TYPES OF AIRCRAFT HOWEVER CONFIGURED,
THE POSSIBILITY ENSUES IN ESSENCE THAT AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE NOT
HEAVY BOMBERS WILL BE INCLUDED AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS.

SUCH AN APPROACH IS UNFOUNDED AND WOULD BE CONTRARY TO
THE PROVISIONS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, BY WHICH THE
SIDES ARE TO BE GUIDED.

TO SUM UP, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE DEFINITION
FOR HEAVY BOMBERS, PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, CONTAINS A
COMPLETELY PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS UNDERSTANDING OF WHICH
SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS BEING
ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE
ADDITIONAL CRITERIA, WHICH IN PRACTICE WOULD, AS ALREADY
SHOWN HERE, LEAD ONLY TO AMBIGUITIES AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF ALL MANNER OF SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS, ARE COMPLETELY
UNSOUND, NO MATTER UNDER WHAT PRETEXT SUCH ATTEMPTS ARE
UNDERTAKEN.

ON THE DEFINITION OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH
A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS. THE PERTINENT PROPOSAL OF THE
SOVIET SIDE STEMS ENTIRELY FROM THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED
IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE. THE FORMULATION OF OCTOBER 8, 1975
CONTAINS SIMILAR EXPRESSIONS. AS FOR THE REMAINING DIF-
FERENCE, YOU KNOW THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE, AND I
DO NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THIS
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ASPECT TODAY.

ON THE DEFINITION OF LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON THIS MATTER TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN THIS CONNECTION IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. THE FORMULATION TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE FULLY DEFINES THE LAUNCHERS TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 1,320, AND INCORPORATES THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MIRVS, WHICH WAS NOTED, IN PARTICULAR, IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 8, 1975.

THE SOVIET DEFINITION, WHICH IS ALSO SUBSTANTIATED FROM A TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, ENCOMPASSES PRECISELY ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, AND NOT SOME KIND OF OTHER SYSTEMS, AND THUS PROVIDES A PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF THE VERY SUBJECT OF LIMITATION. IT DRAWS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MRVS NOT INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE.

ALL OF THIS, WE ARE CONVINCED, CREATES THE PREREQUISITES FOR THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULATIONS WITH THE GOAL OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE ENTIRE DEFINITION OF LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

MR. AMBASSADOR, THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS WE HAVE SET FORTH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE FORMULATIONS FOR DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED.
JOHNSON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 OCT 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SALTT00422
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750367-0413
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751028/aaaaazbg.tel
Line Count: 419
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <29 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SALT TALKS
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006